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“Mentioning that a human has two legs is useful for differentiating a person from a goat or a 
toaster, but it is hard to think up further specification that does not degenerate into a long 
disjunction of special cases. Even if such an expansion were successful, the resulting tome would 
no longer serve the purposes of efficient communication or […] instruction.” 
--Lee Brooks and Samuel Hannah 
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Abstract:  Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of 
combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning.  The claim is that 
beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories.  I argue that 
this “diachronic” penetration thesis is false.  In order to substantiate a robust notion of 
penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subjects 
learn.  However, they cannot do so, since in order to help with learning they must instruct 
learners to employ previously existing abilities.  I argue that a better approach recognizes 
that we can have sophisticated causal precursors to perceptual learning, but that the learning 
process itself must operate outside of cognitive influence. 
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If cognitive penetration occurs, then perceptual experience is affected by the content of 
cognitive states. This entails that perceptual processes are modified by interaction with 
cognition.1  Recently, a number of theorists have argued in favor of the diachronic cognitive 
penetration thesis (dCPT), the view that perception is permeated by cognition in the course of 
perceptual learning (Cecchi, 2014; Siegel, 2013; Stokes, 2021; Stokes & Bergeron, 2015). The 
argument for the dCPT is abductive, and is based on an enabling claim.  The idea is that there 
are certain kinds of contents, particularly those corresponding to kinds of objects, that 
perception on its own lacks the capacity to represent, but that interaction with cognition 
eventually enables them to do so. 
It has recently been pointed out that the notion of ‘penetration’ has gendered 
connotations (Ransom, 2020).  In what follows, I will use ‘permeation’ instead, but I mean to 
reference the same thesis philosophers have investigated (so, the thesis under consideration 
is the diachronic permeation thesis, with the same acronym).  My aims in this paper are to 
articulate the commitments of the dCPT, to raise problems for the view, and to propose an 
alternative for the possible role of beliefs in perceptual learning.  In particular I argue that, 
if the dCPT is true, then category-specific beliefs must be held prior to perceptual learning 
and must specify the learned perceptual content.  If these conditions are not met, then 
another thesis is more plausible, namely that cognitive states serve as causal precursors to a 
purely internal process of perceptual learning.  I will argue for the second position, 
enlisting current perspectives from the psychology of perceptual learning.   
In section 1, I’ll flesh out the dCPT in more detail, and articulate the priority and 
specificity conditions. In section 2 I’ll discuss perceptual learning, and argue for the minimal 
claim that category-relevant perceptual learning can occur without cognitive permeation.  
Section 3 then raises objections against the dCPT, the key move being to question whether 
the enabling role posited for beliefs posited by the dCPT is in fact incompatible with their 
fulfilling the specificity condition.  In order to guide learning, I argue, beliefs must describe 
contents that subjects can already perceive.  But if that is so, then they cannot describe the 
novel contents learned.  Section 4 considers and rejects ways of weakening the dCPT to 
avoid this argument. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  The dCPT 
 
1.1.  The dCPT. 
 
Cognitive permeation is an explanatory thesis.  The idea is that there are perceptual 
differences amongst perceivers, or within a perceiver over time, and the best explanation 
for those differences is that the contents of cognitive states have modified perceptual 
 
1 There are a variety of ways of describing this relationship: perceptual representations must bear a “logical 
relationship” to knowledge (Pylyshyn, 1999); perception uses cognition as an “informational resource” (Wu, 
2013); there is an “inferential” relationship between cognitive states and the outputs of perception (Brogaard & 
Chomanski, 2015). These characterizations are highly ambiguous (Burnston, 2017a), but I will take them as read 
here.  
processing.  While the thesis itself is internal to the philosophy of psychology, its 
ramifications are potentially widespread. 
One reason for these widespread ramifications is the thought that cognitive 
permeation might be one way in which perception can be enriched.  If our percepts come to 
reflect our beliefs or theoretical assumptions, then they represent more about the world 
than just what they can glean from sensory input.  In turn, cognitive permeation has been 
proposed as one potential explanation for how perception comes to represent higher-level 
properties, i.e. categories beyond simple perceptual features like shape and color (Siegel, 
2013).  It has been used as one way of explaining the kinds of dispositions developed by 
skilled perfomers (Fridland, 2015), to account for moral perception (Cowan, 2014) and, 
more recently, for a wider range of expertise effects (Ransom, 2020; Stokes, 2021)2.  
Theorists have gone on to consider the epistemic upshot of enriched perception, arguing 
both for its potential benefits and its potential detriments for perceptual justification (Siegel, 
2012, 2016; Stokes, 2021). 
So, the issue of whether cognitive permeation occurs is important for a range of 
philosophical enterprises.  Unfortunately, the extensive debate about cognitive permeation 
has failed to produce even an agreed-upon definition of the thesis.  Theorists disagree on, 
amongst other things:  whether cognitive influence on perception must be direct 
(Macpherson, 2012; Raftopoulos, 2015); whether causal interactions between them are 
sufficient, or whether stronger semantic and computational relationships are required 
(Stokes, 2013; Wu, 2017; Burnston, 2017a); whether cognitive permeation results in 
representation of higher-level contents or in changes to lower-level properties (Briscoe, 
2015; Siegel, 2013; Stokes & Bergeron, 2015); and, importantly, whether attentional effects 
count as instances of permeation (Gross, 2017; Marchi, 2017; Mole, 2015; Stokes, 2018).  
Some have even suggested that cognitive permeation should be characterized purely 
according to its consequences for relevant philosophical debates (Stokes, 2015). 
While there are different characterizations of cognitive permeation, one thing should 
not be up for debate, namely that the truth of the cognitive permeation thesis would be a 
surprising and transformative result for our understanding of the mind.  The idea is that 
certain empirical and theoretical considerations force us to give up the intuitive view that 
changing our beliefs does not change what we perceive (Firestone & Scholl, 2016).  So, when 
considering the cognitive permeation thesis, we should ask whether the kind of relations 
discovered between cognition and perception prompt this sort of foundational change to 
our understanding, or whether more mundane notions can capture the evidence at hand.  It 
is in this spirit that the present paper attempts to assess the issue. 
 
 
2 The papers by Ransom (2020) and Stokes (2021) were published while this paper was in submission.  There is 
considerable commonality between my conclusion and Ransom’s.  That said, I focus on slightly different 
phenomena in perceptual learning than Ransom does, and provide distinct (if compatible) arguments against 
the dCPT. 
One thread of the argument that has been present since early discussion of cognitive 
permeation, is whether it occurs through perceptual learning.  Churchland (1988) classically 
argued that, to the extent that perceptual systems were plastic, they were likely to be 
infiltrated by knowledge, and hence that perception is likely theory laden.  Recent interest 
in learning has picked back up, as it is one potential explanation for the existence of higher-
level content and for perceptual expertise.  And there is strong reason to focus on 
perceptual learning as a test case.  For one thing, learning often involves changes in one’s 
beliefs, and therefore is one possible case in which a change in belief could eventuate a 
change in perception.  Moreover, expertise often involves training, wherein one 
intentionally focuses on certain features of examples in order to develop one’s abilities.  If 
perception is changed during this process, then it seems a likely case for cognitive 
permeation. 
Here as well, however, we find a diversity of views.  Perceptual learning itself is 
defined in different ways, sometimes in terms of generated perceptual abilities—e.g. of 
discrimination or generalization—and sometimes in terms of changes in perceptual contents 
(Connolly, 2014, 2019; Prettyman, 2018).  Some have advanced the position that, for certain 
instances of perceptual learning, learning effects are evidence that cognitive permeation 
occurs.  Stokes and Bergeron (2015), for example cite cases of categorical perception, on which 
learned categories modify perception, as proof that cognitive permeation occurs during 
perceptual learning, while Firestone and Scholl (2016; cf. Valenti & Firestone, 2019) 
challenge this view.  Others, as mentioned, only take cognitive permeation as one possible 
explanation for perceptual learning (Siegel, 2013), or consider that some instances of 
learning may be instances of permeation and others not (Stokes, 2021).  And some, indeed, 
propose that perceptual learning is an alternative to cognitive permeation (Connolly, 2014; 
Arstila, 2016), i.e. that learning within the perceptual system is an alternative explanation to 
the permeation thesis. 
This is a tangled, almost bewildering set of considerations, and I want to remain 
neutral towards as many of them as possible.  I assume that genuine perceptual learning 
occurs, which modifies perceptual representations and results in novel perceptual abilities.  
I will further discuss evidence that such changes occur at several “levels” of perception, 
although I will remain neutral on whether the higher levels constitute higher-level contents.  
(For an extended discussion of the relationship between these representations and the 
debate on higher-level contents, see Burnston, in submission.)  The question then is 
whether, in any of these cases, cognitive permeation is the right explanation of effects in 
perceptual learning.  I will use the language of perceptual representation and perceptual 
content, but I do not commit in this paper to any particular way of typing contents.  Instead, 
I will try to describe the representations at work as directly as possible.  
I will assume a broadly semantic conception of cognitive permeation at the outset, 
and I will consider later whether one can abandon this conception.  According to the 
semantic conception, a specific change occurs within perception and is explained by the 
content of the permeating state.  This entails that perception has access to or processes the 
content of cognitive states (Wu, 2017; Ransom, 2020).  Further, it entails that the contents of 
cognition can explain the changes in the contents of perception.  That is, perception 
operates differently after learning, and the reason for that specific change is that it has taken 
the contents of cognitive states into account in modifying its processing.  I further presume 
that attentional mediation is one good candidate for a mechanism that might bring that 
change about.  That is, cognitive instruction to intend to a stimulus in such-and-such a way 
is one plausible way in which cognitive permeation could occur.  The question I will 
consider is whether, given the empirical data on perceptual learning, cognitive permeation 
of this sort is a good explanation for that learning. 
This focus on explanation fits well with the abductive nature of arguments that 
many proponents of cognitive permeation espouse.  After looking at a range of effects, 
these theorists argue, the best account of changes to perceptual experience is permeation 
(Stokes, 2021; Stokes & Bergeron, 2015).  In particular, I am interested in a variety of enabling 
claim.  The idea here is that cognitive permeation—i.e. the resources provided by cognitive 
contents—allows perception to work in a way that it could not on its own.  So, for instance, 
Stokes and Bergeron argue that, while perception may have evolved a capacity to represent 
faces, “there is no account to be given about the evolution or plasticity of perception for the 
Pink Panther or the Coca-Cola icon” (p. 16; cf. Stokes & Bergeron, 2015, p. 325).  If 
perception itself lacks the resources to discriminate these categories, then perhaps 
processing cognitive contents is how perception comes to do so.  Similarly, Cecchi suggests 
that, when perceptual learning occurs during intentional practice at a task, it is because 
“cognitively induced architectural modulations enable […] the visual system to perform the 
[…] task” (2014, p. 91).   
So, finally, my construal of the dCPT is this.  Perception develops novel abilities 
during the course of perceptual learning, and the explanation for how it does so is that it 
processes cognitive contents.  In the next section I explore the commitments of this kind of 
view, and articulate an alternative, namely that the role of cognition in perceptual learning 
is merely to serve a as more-or-less sophisticated causal precursor to a purely internal 
process of perceptual learning.  An effect that can be explained as a causal precursor to a 
change in perception is not sufficient to compel the transformative consequences that 
cognitive permeation is supposed to have.  The position I will argue for is that, although 
causal precursors can be quite important and specific, the learning that perception does is 
based solely on interaction with a stimulus-set, not on processing cognitive contents (cf. 
Ransom, 2020). 
 
1.2.  Candidates and conditions 
 
Given the enabling role in perceptual learning that is posited for beliefs by the dCPT, the 
first condition that any potential permeator should meet is what I’ll call the priority 
condition.  Since it is the presence of beliefs that is supposed to enable perceptual learning, 
those beliefs must be ones that the subject plausibly possesses before the content is learned. 
Meeting the priority condition, though, is insufficient, since there are many kinds of beliefs 
that could meet the condition but fail to be good candidate permeators.  Here are three 
kinds of beliefs that are poor candidates for implementing diachronic permeation. 
The first is essentialist beliefs. Suppose that you know something about the 
respective chemical structures of jadeite and nephrite, or the facts about phylogenetic 
history that distinguish whales from fish. While the propositions that are the contents of 
these beliefs are (at least if you’re an essentialist) definitive of the categories to which 
they apply, the contents of the beliefs themselves have no upshot for how the categories 
should be perceived.  Knowledge of chemical structure doesn’t help you perceptually 
discriminate jadeite from nephrite. Similarly, knowledge about cladistics doesn’t suggest 
modifying your percepts of whales or fish in any particular way. This is true even if you 
hold the beliefs prior to learning to perceive the kind. 
A second poor set of candidates is demonstrative beliefs. Suppose I hand you an 
object of a type you’ve never seen before, and say “this is a glunk.” You might reasonably 
form the belief that the object you are now holding is a glunk. It is true that the 
demonstrative ‘this’ refers to a particular glunk, but the simple content of the term doesn’t 
contain the resources to help you learn what’s perceptually characteristic of glunks. 
Indeed, the belief would play the same role no matter what glunks in fact look like. Hence, 
the demonstrative belief doesn’t have the right kind of content to inform perceptual 
learning. (I’ll discuss this example further in the next section.) 
A third kind of beliefs, which we might call denotational beliefs, have more content 
than bare demonstratives, but their primary role is still to pick out the category to be learned. 
So, suppose you’re about to walk into a room full of objects, and I tell you “The glunks 
are on the far left.” This belief might help you figure out which are the glunks, by 
providing a behavioral instruction to look at some objects rather than others.  As in the 
demonstrative case, however, the content of the belief has no resources to inform the 
actual perceptual category you might learn. Again, the belief will play the same role no 
matter what perceptual characteristics actually individuate glunks, and hence cannot 
inform perception how glunks should be represented. 
These considerations suggest that another condition is needed, which I will call the 
specificity condition: a candidate permeator must have sufficiently specific content to 
inform the particular perceptual content that is learned. A belief that meets the priority 
condition but not the specificity condition, I suggest, is best construed as a causal 
precursor to an instance of perceptual learning. A belief or other cognitive state’s being a 
causal precursor to a percept, nearly everyone acknowledges, is not sufficient to make 
that belief a permeator of the percept. Suppose you know that a particular bird nests only 
on sheltered alcoves atop very high mountain ranges. This knowledge, along with some 
sophisticated knowledge about how to climb mountains, might eventuate in your 
learning to perceive baby birds of that type. But your knowledge of the location of the 
birds and how to navigate to a place where you can see them does not tell perception 
anything much about what it should do to recognize that type of baby bird specifically.  
This is true even if the knowledge is a necessary precursor—i.e. if climbing were the only 
way you could ever gain access to the birds. 
Importantly, we now have an alternative interpretation of the “enabling” effect of 
cognitive states on some perceptual process. On this view, enabling beliefs are only causal 
precursors—they might point you in the direction of the objects-to-be-perceived, but do 
not permeate the eventual learned perception. Only beliefs that meet the specificity 
condition in addition to the priority condition would force us to read enabling effects in 
terms of permeation. In section 5, I will consider whether a proponent of the dCPT can 
reasonably give up on or try to weaken the priority and specificity conditions while still 
offering an interesting thesis.  For now, I will assume that both the priority and specificity 
conditions must be met by any successful candidate permeator. 
Given these considerations, the prima facie best candidate for a type of belief that 
might permeate perceptual learning—and the one that I think most defenders of the 
dCPT have in mind—is descriptivist beliefs. These beliefs have as their content the 
properties, including the perceptible properties, that members of a kind have. 
Dachshunds, for instance, are long, brown, and short-legged. Maybe the belief that 
glunks are (say) large and green has the right kind of content to permeate perceptual 
learning, even if demonstrative or denotational beliefs do not.  This view has some 
backing:  Leslie (2008) has argued that “generic” beliefs about kinds are fundamental to 
cognition and learning, and generics often have descriptivist content—e.g. “Tigers have 
stripes.”  Reliance on descriptivist beliefs is perhaps the way to interpret Siegel’s claim 
that we learn to recognize pine trees by coming to believe that they have “certain kinds of 
leaves and structure” (2013, p. 715), or Stokes’ (2014) claim that we learn to recognize 
Mondrian’s paintings in virtue of forming beliefs about their “organizational features” (p. 
17).  The question is, can these kinds of beliefs meet the priority and specificity 
conditions?  
In the next section I will outline the relevant psychological results on perceptual 
learning.  I’ll argue that in certain instances, perceptual learning of categorical content 
occurs without cognitive permeation.  This will then provide the framework for asking 
whether descriptivist beliefs in general have the right kind of content to implement the 
dCPT. 
  
2.   Perceptual Learning 
 
In this section, I will describe a current perspective on perceptual  category learning.3 The 
core idea behind the framework is what is called a “morphspace.” Perceptual learning, 
the story goes, forms categories by differentiating and accentuating dimensions of 
perceptual difference between kinds of objects. According to the morphspace view, each 
 
3 See, e.g. Folstein, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2010; Folstein, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2012; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; 
Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone & Hendrickson, 2010; Goldstone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001; Goldstone & Steyvers, 
2001; Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008. 
perceptual category corresponds to a “space” defined along relevant dimensions. 
Dimensions can either correspond to low- level perceptual features (size, luminance, etc.) 
or to higher-order relationships between these features. Important higher-order 
relationships involve configural (arrangement in space) and associational (correlation) 
relations between lower-order dimension values. Perceptual learning, on this perspective, 
can both learn novel dimensions and modify extant dimensions. As categories are 
learned, dimensions can be “morphed” so that intra-category members are seen as closer 
along the relevant dimensions.4   
While I will not make any explicit claims about higher-level content, the 
distinction between lower- and higher-order dimensions does show that perceptual 
learning operates at several distinct “levels,” which correspond to novel categories.  I do 
suggest that this kind of learning underlies the kinds of recognitional dispositions that 
some take to be indicative of higher-level content.  My purpose in this section is to argue 
that this kind of learning can operate to develop and modify morphspaces in category-
specific ways without cognitive influence.  This will allow us to then question whether the 
dCPT is the best explanation of perceptual learning in some cases. 
Studies in categorical perception rely on training with exemplars, either with or 
without feedback. Studies without feedback show that subjects can form higher-order 
dimensions through mere exposure. Folstein et al. (2010) showed subjects a range of 
cartoon creatures (see Figure 1), where in the training set there were correlations between 
different lower-level features—for instance, particular wing shapes and head shapes, as 
well as particular body and arm shapes, might be correlated with each other, where there 
was no such relation between (e.g.) wings and legs. Having multiple correlations present 
in the same stimuli set was done to prevent subjects from forming, unprompted, specific 
beliefs about category-membership. Subjects also performed a distractor task (judging 
how centered the stimulus was on the screen), which was intended to prevent them from 
forming category beliefs. 
 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli from Folstein et al. (2010). 
 
4 This can sometimes correspond to a loss of discriminatory capacity within a category.  In general, perceptual 
category learning is a generalization and discrimination tradeoff. 
 
In the experiment, subjects were capable of picking up on the higher-order correlations in 
the stimuli.  This was shown by a secondary task, in which subjects had to categorize 
novel examples. If categories in the second task matched the correlations in the exposure 
set, subjects learned them more quickly than if the categories did not match those 
correlations.  If the controls worked, then subjects are capable of this kind of learning even 
if they form no category-specific beliefs.  Folstein et al.’s interpretation is that it is possible 
for perception to form novel higher-order dimensions purely through “statistical 
perceptual learning,” without influence from beliefs.  Similar results have been shown for 
other kinds of stimuli (Fiser & Aslin, 2001].   
Importantly for what follows, there are cases where category-specific feedback is 
provided to perceivers, and this feedback plays a role in learning, but where, I will argue, 
the feedback does not meet the specificity condition. 
 
 
Figure 2. From Gureckis and Goldstone (2008). 
 
Figure 2 is an example from a wide range of studies in which subjects learn to differentiate 
objects along arbitrary dimensions (Goldstone & Steyvers, 2001; Gureckis & Goldstone, 
2008; Folstein et al., 2012; Jones & Goldstone, 2013).  The experimenters created a 
morphspace of faces by taking four distinct faces, and creating exemplars (each square in 
Figure 2) that continuously blended each of their features. Subjects in these studies were 
shown exemplar pictures, and told whether each was an “A” face or a “B” face, where As 
and Bs were defined according to the arbitrary vertical line in the center of the space.   
A variety of results from this kind of paradigm suggest that subjects learn to 
differentiate the novel dimensions of the space.  For instance, after learning to make the 
discrimination, the dimensions transfer to new stimuli and categorizations (Goldstone and 
Steyvers, 2001), such that subsequent discriminations along the previously learned 
dimension are easier than along other dimensions.  Moreover, these learned representation 
affect similarity judgments.  Across a range of types of similarity judgment, subjects tend to 
treat within-category members as more similar to each other after training than they did 
before training.  In the example from figure 2, this involves differentiating and then 
morphing the category-distinguishing horizontal “Dimension A.” 
   Hence, in this and other cases, perceptual learning both forms novel dimensions and 
stretches the morphspace along those dimensions to accentuate the difference between 
categories.  But this kind of learning also modifies representations of lower-level features.  
Consider two cases. On one, subjects might learn to accentuate discriminations made along 
already differentiable lower-level dimensions. On the other, subjects might learn to 
differentiate between lower-level dimensions that they could not previously tell apart.  




Figure 3.  A morphspace for lower-level properties. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, Goldstone constructed a simple morphspace of squares comprising 
two lower-level dimensions, brightness and size. He then tested a variety of different 
categories defined in the space. For instance, size might be relevant and brightness 
irrelevant (i.e. drawing the categorical line between 2 and 3 on the y-axis) or vice versa 
(i.e. drawing the categorical line between 2 and 3 on the x-axis).  Take just the brightness-
relevant, size-irrelevant case. In this case subjects learned, through feedback of the type 
discussed above, which squares belonged to which category. After training, their 
discriminations along the brightness dimension were heightened while their 
discriminations along the size dimension were diminished. That is, they became more 
sensitive to differences between levels of brightness and less sensitive to differences 
between sizes. 
Goldstone (1994) also created a morphspace of squares based on levels of 
brightness and saturation, rather than size.  What is interesting about this case is that, 
while brightness and saturation can be independently manipulated by an experimenter, 
subjects do not normally perceive them independently. That is, they cannot selectively 
attend to one rather than another, or make discriminations along one independently of 
variation in the other.  Goldstone trained subjects in a similar way on these stimuli, 
separating them into categories based on either brightness or saturation, and training 
subjects on exemplars with feedback.  Somewhat amazingly, subjects do in fact begin to 
differentiate the dimensions, showing similar (although smaller magnitude) learning 
effects as in the brightness and size case. 
So, learning can both differentiate new dimensions, and modify existing 
dimensions to notice and accentuate category differences.  There are now two questions 
to pursue.  The first is whether the subjects’ new representations can be considered 
genuinely perceptual, and then the second is whether they are the result of cognitive 
permeation. 
I suggest that there are two sets of interlocking reasons to consider the learned 
abilities here as due to changes in perceptual representation.  First, notice that it is 
possible to form these representations absent category-specific beliefs.  In the mere 
exposure case of Folstein et al., subjects have no prior beliefs about what will constitute 
the categories, and the control task and multi-associational structure was set up 
specifically to prevent subjects from forming those beliefs during learning.  If these 
manipulations worked, then perception can learn categorical content even with no 
relevant beliefs about the category.   
Moreover, even when subjects were asked to reflect on their judgments and 
describe them, their explanations were often coarse grained and mapped poorly to the 
representations that guided their judgments.  For example, Goldstone and Steyvers (2001) 
report that subjects sometimes used abstract language to describe the categories, 
including such statements as “Faces in [category A] were happier” (Goldstone & 
Steyvers, 2001, p. 135). But this is clearly not specific enough to have informed their 
judgments. Subjects presumably can already discriminate happy from unhappy looking 
faces, but this is not, prior to training, detailed enough for them to discriminate these 
categories of faces from each other. Moreover, Goldstone (personal communication) notes 
that different subjects sometimes use similar descriptive language even if they have 
learned different categorizations, thus proving that their beliefs do not discriminate the 
categories, or at least that they are not required to do so in order for subjects to learn the 
categories.   
The second set of reasons stresses the structure of these learned representations, i.e. 
their dimensional structure.  In these studies, there is a continuous pattern of variation 
amongst the conjunction of features that comprise the examples.  What subjects do is 
learn to represent this pattern of variation, suggesting that the representations learned 
have a kind of metric structure (Burnston, 2017).  While it is true that, according to the 
morphspace framework, the dimensions can be morphed to accentuate category 
difference, this morphing is done within the metric structure—that is, what is modified is 
the distance metric between examples along the relevant dimensions, and this is what 
underlies the changes in similarity judgments.   
Arguably, representations of this type do not meet some standard conditions on 
concept possession, such as the generality constraint (Beck, 2014).  If one thinks that a way 
of distinguishing the conceptual from the non-conceptual is in terms of the structure of 
representations, and thinks further that the way to distinguish the perceptual from the 
cognitive is in terms of the conceptual/non-conceptual divide, then one will be strongly 
motivated to view these representations as perceptual.5 
Moreover, this way of thinking corresponds with some traditional motivations in 
the non-conceptual content literature, which has historically focused on perceptual 
content.  Notice that subjects develop the ability to apply new categorical concepts 
demonstratively—e.g. “that’s an A face”.  But, this ability requires a previously existing 
representation which serves as the ground for that demonstrative reference (see further 
discussion below).  This kind of point has been used by defenders of non-conceptual 
content to combat the idea that all perceptual content requires demonstrative concepts 
(Roskies, 2010). 
I consider these reasons to be mutually supportive rather than decisive.  But recall 
the dialectic here—proponents of the dCPT posit genuinely perceptual contents which are 
the result of cognitive permeation.  Hence, there should be strong motivation for the 
dCPT proponent to accept these learned representations as perceptual.  The question, 
then, is whether these cases are instances of cognitive permeation.  I suggest that 
whatever beliefs subjects have are inadequate to meet the specificity and priority 
conditions. 
Consider the mere exposure cases first.  If the manipulations and controls worked, 
then in this case subjects simply had no category-relevant beliefs prior to learning, and 
the resulting representations could not be due to permeation.  Next, consider the face 
case, in which subjects do in fact form beliefs during the learning process.  In particular, 
based on the feedback, they are in a position to form a series of demonstrative beliefs, 
such as that a particular example was an ‘A’ face.  In the last section, I suggested that 
demonstrative beliefs of this sort do not have the right kind of content to meet the 
specificity condition.  Let’s consider this a little further.   
There are two ways of individuating belief contents, narrow and wide.  Speaking 
very loosely:  narrow contents correspond to what the subject is prepared to do in virtue of 
a belief—i.e. the effect that the belief has on other psychological processes and behavior. 
Wide contents correspond to the extension of the belief. Neither way of individuating 
demonstrative belief contents supports a reading in terms of cognitive permeation. 
The narrow content that the demonstrative belief has is very sparse. It can only 
convey something like “treat this as an A face.” Even a series of demonstrative beliefs of 
this sort, corresponding to a set of A faces, can only result in something like “treat these all 
 
5 Beck (2014) argues that representations of this type can be cognitive but non-conceptual.  He bases this 
argument on analogue magnitude representations which, he argues, can be abstracted from any particular 
instance of magnitude judgment.  The kinds of representations I am discussing here, conversely, cannot be so 
dissociated from their instantiations.   I discuss this at length in (Burnston, in submission). 
as A faces.” But this content has no upshot for the perceptual recognition of A faces. 
Knowing that a set of objects should be treated as belonging to the same category doesn’t 
say anything about the perceptual space that they share. Moreover, simply forming a series 
of demonstrative beliefs about already-seen exemplars does not, on its own, say anything 
about how the category should be morphed or extended to novel exemplars, but this is 
precisely what the learned perceptual representation does.6   
So, narrow individuation for demonstrative beliefs won’t secure a result of 
permeation.  Wide individuation fares no better. On the wide individuation, we could 
construe the demonstrative belief as conveying the content that the particular face is a 
member of the set of all A faces, where perhaps one defers to the experimenter to 
determine the extension of the belief. That’s nice enough, but again simply referring to the 
set does nothing to inform the ability that subjects actually learn, which is to recognize that a 
novel example is a member of the set. So, the demonstrative beliefs that subjects might 
form on the basis of these instructions cannot meet the specificity condition. As discussed 
in the previous section, the best way to describe the role of the beliefs is as causal 
precursors. The demonstrative beliefs provide a behavioral instruction to look for 
commonalities among a set of objects. Perceptual learning then does the work of actually 
forming the discriminating representations. 
   One objection to this view would argue that subjects rely on tacit knowledge.  One 
might suggest that, in mere exposure cases, the controls were insufficient to rule out the 
forming of tacit beliefs about what individuates the stimuli.  And, in the feedback case, 
perhaps subjects develop tacit knowledge about how to apply their new concept of an “A 
face,” that they fail to articulate when asked, but which shapes perceptual learning 
nonetheless.  On this objection, subjects’ tacit beliefs might permeate perceptual learning 
in these cases. 
I will consider this objection further in section 5.  For now, there are two points to 
be made about it.  First, it is non-trivial to articulate the tacit knowledge objection in a 
way that is not question begging.  Recall that proponents of the dCPT must admit that 
there are perceptual learning processes that result in novel perceptual content.  I have 
suggested here that, at least in important cases, these processes can happen without 
cognitive permeation.  Insisting that the process must be due to tacit beliefs in spite of the 
arguments above sounds suspiciously like a definitional claim that learning must be due 
to permeation.  A definitional claim is out-of-keeping with the kinds of empirical causal 
arguments put forward by the proponents of the dCPT.   
Second, invocation of tacit beliefs is often motivated by dispositionalist concerns, for 
 
6 Now, I am not trying to deny the importance of labels in general – it has been shown in many instances that 
labels can provide powerful perceptual/attentional cues (although they do not have to be semantically specific to 
the object to do so; Lupyan & Spivey, 2010).  Simply labeling something, however, does nothing to say how that 
object should be perceived, hence the purely demonstrative function of these beliefs.  After one can perceive the 
object a label can provide a powerful attentional cue, but the label itself does not instruct perception to modify 
its processes in any particular way (Burnston, 2017). 
instance the fact that people are inclined to assent to many more propositions than those for 
which they are likely to have explicit, stored propositional representations (e.g. “Neither 
cats nor dogs are numbers”; see Schwitzgebel, 2015). But dispositionalists are not 
committed to a particular underlying psychological nature of the mechanism that produces 
the disposition, and thus are not antagonistic to the possibility that the dispositions are 
underlain by perceptual states.  Given that neo-empiricist accounts of knowledge are at least 
on the table in cognitive science, it is illicit to simply assert that the presence of tacit 
knowledge means there is an influence of a propositional state on a perceptual process.  
Neither of these points is decisive.  All I hope to have suggested here is that an 
appeal to tacit knowledge can’t just be a trump card in this debate.  It has to be 
accompanied by specific claims about the contents of those beliefs and how they affect 
perceptual learning.  I will give reasons in the following sections to suggest that the 
dCPT proponent has no way of formulating this kind of proposal that will meet the 
priority and specificity conditions.   
 Even if you grant me all this, I have only established that cognitive permeation 
doesn’t occur in these cases.  Proponents of cognitive permeation, however, generally don’t 
insist that perception is always permeated, only that it is permeable.  That is, they suggest that 
in some cases perception is cognitively permeated.  Perhaps, even if I am right about these 
cases, cognition permeates perceptual learning in other cases.  Indeed, proponents of the 
dCPT often invoke particular kinds or particular types of learning/expertise for which 
permeation is a likely explanation of developed perceptual content.  The perceptual abilities 
of arborists or art experts might fall into this category (Siegel, 2012, 2013; Stokes, 2014) 
propose.  And Stokes and Bergeron (2015), as discussed above, suggest that perception 
cannot, on its own, learn to represent particularly novel kinds such as cultural icons.   
 In the remainder of the paper I will question whether, even in cases of expertise and 
highly novel kinds, the dCPT is the correct account of how perception comes to represent 
categorical content.  
 
3.  Against the dCPT. 
 
3.1.  Setup 
 
The dCPT posits that certain instances of perceptual modification cannot be explained by 
citing purely internal processes of perceptual learning.  This is what underlies the abductive 
inference that, in certain instances, cases of perceptual learning must be due to cognitive 
permeation.  As mentioned, one of the motivations for this view is that learning processes 
are often highly mediated—they involve intentional, knowledge-based learning that 
requires explicit belief formation and practice.  In the previous sections, I suggested that 
there is empirical evidence that perception can learn to distinguish categories of objects, and 
that this involves changes to perceptual representations at multiple “levels,” but questioned 
whether this process must be a result of cognitive permeation.  I also offered an alternative, 
on which beliefs are merely causal precursors for an independent process of perceptual 
learning. 
 In this section, I consider whether the dCPT is likely to be the best explanation of 
perceptual learning, even in cases of novel, socially mediated kinds, or kinds requiring 
expert training.  Importantly, the morphspace framework developed above has been 
extended to artefactual kinds such as cars (Folstein et al., 2012) as well as to kinds involving 
developed expertise, such as subspecies of birds (Tanaka, Curran, & Scheinberg, 2005).  We 
can thus ask whether, for these kinds of cases, the processes discussed above require 
cognitive permeation.  In section 3.2., I seek to loosen the supposedly close connection 
between category knowledge and categorical perception, by suggesting that our 
descriptivist beliefs regarding kinds are very frequently equivocal with regards to perceptual 
categories.  In section 3.3., I make a stronger argument that the enabling role posited for 
descriptivist beliefs by the dCPT is in fact incompatible with their meeting the specificity 
condition.  If I am right, then the causal precursor view is the better interpretation of how 
prior beliefs interact with perceptual learning.   
 
3.2.  Equivocal Descriptions 
 
The dCPT suggests that perceptually learned representations are due to permeation of 
perception by descriptivist beliefs.  Let’s start to assess this claim by considering the 
category ‘Smurfs’, a cultural artefact if ever there was one, and one that Stokes and 
Bergeron list as a good case to be explained by the dCPT. What kind of beliefs might one 
have about Smurfs prior to learning how to perceive the category? Here’s one candidate 
list: ‘Smurfs are small cartoon people’; ‘Smurfs wear red hats’; ‘Some Smurfs have beards’. 
(Perhaps one forms these beliefs by talking to a neighbor about their kids’ favorite 
cartoons, or something.) Alas, this descriptivist content won’t discriminate between 




Figure 4.  Small cartoon people in red hats. 
 
Anyone with a modicum of experience with these two different cartoons will be able to 
discriminate Smurfs from Gnomes. But, patently, the list above does not make a 
discrimination between these two kinds, since it applies equally to either case. Hence, this 
set of descriptivist beliefs, even if it met priority, would fail specificity— the descriptivist 
belief that the learner has is equivocal between the two perceptual categories, but the 
perceiver precisely learns to distinguish between those categories.   
The natural response here is to posit that learners have more detailed beliefs about 
the categories. One might need the belief that Smurfs are blue (although one would then 
need the further clarification that it is their skin, and not their shirt, that is blue) to pick 
out the Smurfs rather than the Gnomes.  Here is the problem with this.  The dCPT 
suggests that perception on its own cannot come to discriminate the relevant kinds.  As 
such, the view is committed to the idea that subjects who do learn the perceptual 
discrimination have prior beliefs that do distinguish the categories, since these are what 
enable the subsequently developed perceptual ability.  As cases become more fine-grained, 
this requires that the grain of subjects’ prior belief become comparatively more fine-
grained.  The idea that all learners have prior beliefs at the requisite level of grain before 
learning to recognize kinds is, empirically speaking, just unlikely to be correct. Consider 




Figure 5. Gnomes (left) and Littl’ Bits (right). 
 
Despite the significant similarity in terms of their features (they both wear pointy hats, the 
girls wear red dresses, the boys blue shirtsleeves, they both have small noses and big cheeks, 
etc., etc.), anyone who has watched a lot of both “David the Gnome” and “The Littl’ Bits” 
can easily make the perceptual discrimination between one and the other. The proponent of 
the dCPT is forced into a pretty awkward stance regarding these kinds. They must insist 
that anyone who learns to make this discrimination, prior to learning to do so, has sufficiently 
fine-grained beliefs to inform the perceptual categories.  I submit that, in my own case, this 
is not what happened. At least, it certainly wasn’t the case that, when I was four years old 
watching these cartoons, anyone sat me down and gave me a thorough list of things to look 
for before I learned how to recognize the kinds.  The proponent of the dCPT is forced into 
trying to articulate a process by which novice perceivers come by very fine-grained 
perceptual beliefs prior to learning, or they must admit that perceptual learning forms the 
discriminating representations on its own, at least in many cases.     
 If perception can learn to discriminate these categories, at least in many cases, absent 
permeation, the inference to the best explanation posited by the dCPT is strongly 
questioned.  On the other hand, the view that beliefs are important causal precursors to 
perceptual learning, I suggest, is fully compatible with the datum that our descriptive 
beliefs are often equivocal between kinds that we can easily discriminate perceptually, at 
least after some learning.  Consider the beliefs one is actually likely to have prior to 
category learning in everyday contexts.  Sure, this set may include some beliefs describing 
general perceptual features.  But it is also likely to include beliefs about when and where to 
find the objects.  One might know, for instance, that The Smurfs is on Nickelodeon at 4, 
whereas David the Gnome is on at 5.  This could help you learn to discriminate the objects 
without requiring fine-grained descriptivist beliefs that meet the specificity condition. 
 What I am ultimately suggesting is that descriptivist beliefs are just another variety of 
denotational beliefs.  Just like I might say, “Glunks are the objects on the left,” I might say, 
“Smurfs are the little cartoon people in red hats that are on Nickelodeon at 4.”  What each 
set of beliefs does is help you locate the set of objects to be learned, so that these can be treated 
as exemplars for the category.  But to play this role, all descriptivist beliefs have to do is 
enable you to sort the Xs from the non-Xs.  And so long as the beliefs are descriptive enough 
to sort the exemplars appropriately, they will do the job.  That is, they can do the job 
without specifically describing how Xs should be represented perceptually.  As with the 
birds-on-top-of-mountains example discussed in section 2, this prior knowledge can play an 
important role in learning, but doesn’t need to do so via describing to perception the 
content it should learn.  A similar point goes for guided attention.  All that one has to do 
attentively is focus on the right objects so that perceptual learning can go to work, and if I 
am right, then that’s all that they do.  (This is the point of the quote in the epigraph from 
Brooks and Hannah, 2006.) 
 This is true even when descriptivist beliefs are very specific.  Return again to figure 
5.  You may or may not have noticed that Littl’ Bits, but not Gnomes, have little red dots on 
their cheeks.  My telling you this might indeed help you look at them and say “Ah, ok, 
these are the Gnomes and these are the Littl’ Bits”.  But notice how far short the content 
comes of describing the perceptual category learned, at least if the morphspace view is 
correct.  If the morphspace view is correct, then what is definitive of the perceptual category 
of Little Bits is not just their red cheeks—it’s a complex set of correlations and configural 
relationships between lower-order properties (the shape and spacing of facial and bodily 
features, etc.).  This content, however, is not described by your knowledge of red cheeks.  
Again, it has served as a (albeit important) causal precursor to perceptual learning.   
 All I have established so far, however, is that in many quotidian cases we can expect 
descriptive beliefs to fail to be fine-grained enough to describe learned perceptual content, 
and hence to deny the view that perception on its own cannot learn to discriminate 
categories.   In many ways, expertise-through-training is the best case for the dCPT theorist.  
In these kinds of examples, learners are often specifically encouraged to look for certain 
features of the objects that fall within categories.  In the next subsection, I offer an argument 
that even this apparently obvious case is misleading.  Indeed, I will suggest that the 
enabling role posited by the dCPT is actually incompatible with descriptivist beliefs meeting 
the specificity condition.   
 
3.3.  An Incompatibility Argument. 
 
The kind of argument I take to most strongly speak against the dCPT suggests that, 
precisely because of the enabling role posited for descriptivist beliefs by the dCPT, they 
cannot meet the specificity condition.  Put informally, the concern is this.  Learning requires 
leveraging extant abilities in service of developing new ones.  Training and expertise indeed 
involves describing the objects to be recognized, but in order to help the trainee, these 
descriptions must tell subjects what to do.  That is, they must invoke them to focus on 
certain objects or properties they can already perceive, on pain of being unhelpful for 
learning.  But if descriptions name already-perceivable content, and what subjects learn is 
novel perceptual content, then the specificity condition cannot be met.  (This is, basically, a 
variety of Meno’s paradox for the cognition-perception interaction.)  Here is the argument 
in more formal gloss. 
 
1. If the dCPT is true, then prior descriptivist beliefs that meet the specificity 
condition enable perceptual learning. 
2. In order to enable learning, descriptivist beliefs must have as their content 
perceptual features that subjects can already perceive. 
3. Perceptual learning results in novel perceptual content. 




5. The content of the beliefs that enable learning is distinct from the perceptual 




6. It is not the case that prior descriptivist beliefs that meet the specificity 




7. It is not the case that the dCPT is true. (From 1 and 6 via Modus Tollens) 
 
The argument hangs on premise (2), and the move from (5) to (6). Premise (3) is granted by 
all parties, and premise (4) is trivial. Premise (1) is true so long as the dCPT theorist 
accepts the priority and specificity conditions. Step (5) follows from the lack of identity 
from learned to novel content, (6) from that claim plus a strong version of specificity, and 
then (7) is a simple deduction. This section will focus on premise (2). I will then consider 
in the next section whether a dCPT theorist might attempt to challenge (1), or the step from 
(5) to (6), by abandoning or weakening the conditions. 
Premise (2) is intended to drive a wedge between the enabling thesis and specificity, 
and show that the two cannot be maintained together. The idea is simply that any 
instruction- or belief-based learning must leverage our extant abilities in the service of 
generating new abilities. So, if contents of beliefs are to enable learning, then they must 
name and enlist already extant perceptual abilities—my telling you that Smurfs have red 
hats, big shoes, beards, etc., will avail you not at all if you can’t already perceptually 
recognize those features. But if prior beliefs must name features that a subject can already 
perceive, and the content they learn is distinct from that content, then the content of the 
beliefs cannot be specific to the content that is learned.  Let’s take novel dimensions first, 
and then modifications to already represented dimensions.   
Consider the category of A faces from Gureckis and Goldstone’s study. There are a 
number of features of these faces that subjects can already perceive—noses, ears, eyes, etc. 
But naming any of these features, or even a conjunction of them, is not the same as naming 
the dimensions that subjects actually learn, because these dimensions are higher-order 
ones that capture the configural and correlational structure of the space. One cannot 
describe these dimensions in terms of simple feature descriptions, of the type that subjects 
are likely to already be able to perceive. Indeed, it is hard to describe them in simple terms 
at all, as evident by the poor job that subjects do in describing the dimensions they’ve 
learned.  Thus, descriptivist beliefs that might actually help learning aren’t going to do so 
by describing the novel contents that perceivers learn.   
Similarly, there is evidence that learned perceptual categories outstrip descriptive 
beliefs.  Brooks & Hannah (2006) had subjects learn to recognize a set of cartoon creatures 
on the basis of a description.  They then had them perform a transfer task on objects that 
equally met the description, but varied in their overall similarity with the training set.  
Subjects performed better when the similarity was high, which showed that their learning 
outstripped the descriptions they had been given.   
This dynamic is seen even more clearly in the Goldstone case which distinguished 
brightness from saturation.  Given that subjects cannot perceive these dimensions 
independently, prior to training, simply telling them, for instance, that category “A” 
squares are distinguished by their saturation, cannot help them learn how to discriminate 
the squares.  What should they look for to see the difference in saturation?  Given that 
saturation, for them, is bound up perceptually with the orthogonally varying brightness, 
the instruction doesn’t help.  However, with the demonstrative feedback and training over 
exemplars, they can learn to differentiate this dimension.  The process doesn’t require, and 
indeed would not be helped by, descriptions of the category-relevant features. 
This leaves us with the best-case scenario for the dCPT theorist, on which 
descriptions name already-perceivable features, and these features are definitive of the 
category.  So, in the brightness versus size case from Goldstone (1994), subjects could easily 
be told that category As are bigger and Bs smaller, or that As are bright while Bs dark, etc.  
But, as I suggested at the time, this seeming content specificity is misleading.  The 
behaviors that are novel are the ability for increased discrimination along these dimensions.  
But what the descriptivist beliefs describe—i.e. to sort by size or brightness, is an ability 
that the subjects already had before that learning.  So, while what is learned is semantically 
consistent with the instruction, the instruction doesn’t tell perception how to represent the 
stimulus—the novel ability arises due to the repeated interaction between perception and 
the stimulus (cf., Ransom, 2020).  Hence, the content of the descriptivist belief in fact “runs 
out” before perceptual learning takes over.  (I mean this semantically, not temporally.  It is 
likely that we continue to use our beliefs to sort during learning.)   
Again, there are empirical cases in which this exact dynamic plays out.  Sowden et 
al. (Sowden, Davies, & Roling, 2000) had inexperienced subjects study radiography 
images, with the instruction that abnormalities in these images show up as dots. It is well-
established that expert radiographers have more fine-grained perceptual sensitivities than 
novices in these kinds of stimuli. After training with the images, subjects in fact showed 
increased sensitivity—they could perceive dots at lower levels of contrast than they had 
before. However, failure of transfer shows that this ability clearly outstripped the 
descriptive belief about dots. Subjects who were trained on positive contrast (brighter 
than background) dots did not improve on discriminating negative contrast (darker than 
background) dots, and vice-versa. But this is just to say that the ability they learn is not 
specified by the beliefs they had, since the same belief resulted in distinct abilities (positive 
versus negative contrast sensitivity) depending on the stimulus. Again, the content of the 
descriptivist belief named an already extant perceptual ability (recognizing dots), and it 
was perceptual engagement with the training set that actually produced the learning 
effect.  These kinds of effects have been posited to be relevant to expertise in general 
(Brooks & Hannah, 2006). 
A last, and famous, example is that of chicken sexing.  Biederman and Shiffrar 
(1987) showed that one could short-circuit the extensive exemplar training usually 
required by chicken sexers by (i) showing subjects where to look for the “genital bulb,” 
which is the distinguishing feature of males and females, and (ii) telling them that male 
genital bulbs were convex and female ones concave.  The fact that performance improves 
almost immediately has been taken as a way of arguing that no perceptual learning at all 
occurs in this case (Pylyshyn, 2003).  Indeed, as Biederman and Shiffrar note, it is the fact 
that the visual system is already well-attuned to convexity and concavity that allows this 
immediate improvement.  What is generally glossed over in discussion of this case, 
however, is that performance improved, but not fully to the level of experts.  This is 
because there are range of specific concave or convex shapes that experts can discriminate.  
Rather than suggesting finer-grained descriptions, however, Biederman and Shiffrar 
suggest that the instructions would have to be combined with extensive training on 
exemplars.  That is, the content of the description, and its aid in learning, is exhausted by 
describing features subjects can already perceive.   
So, I suggest that the enabling role posited for descriptivist beliefs by the dCPT is in 
fact incompatible with their meeting the specificity condition.  And if so, then the dCPT 
misdescribes the learning process—the better account is one that restricts beliefs to causal 
precursors.  I wish to emphasize that the arguments in the last two sections have been 
about the possible roles of descriptivist belief contents, and therefore don’t rely on whether 
the beliefs are explicit or tacit.  In the next section, I will consider several objections.  First, I 
will consider whether a more sophisticated view of tacit knowledge could save the dCPT 
here.  Then I will consider whether there is a substantive version of the dCPT that could 
weaken or abandon the priority or specificity conditions.   
 
4.  Objections 
 
4.1.  Sophisticated Tacit Belief 
 
One might complain that I have oversimplified the contents of the beliefs at play here, by 
taking them as analogous to simple linguistic descriptions.  There is an informal and a 
formal way to cash out this objection.  The informal way involves noting that, at some level, 
there is a match in content between the prior belief and the resulting perceptual state – both 
represent the category ‘gnomes’.  One might suggest that simply by suggesting that the set 
of objects can be grouped together, the specificity condition is met.  Or, one might say that 
there is more content to the belief than simply to label a set of objects as ‘gnomes’.  Perhaps 
the ‘gnome’ content carries with it a range of deeper connotations that perception can use in 
learning the category.   
These informal responses fail because, along the lines given in section 2, they fail to 
explain how the belief’s content could instruct perception how to represent the category, 
and it is just this kind of informational relation that is posited in the enabling claim.  The 
first version gives no account of how the grouping label informs the specific content that 
constitutes the perceptual category – that is, the morphspace.  The second version, which 
posits a richer content to the ‘gnome’ belief than the ones I’ve listed, is obscure.  One would 
have to theorize about what these richer connotations might be, and, if what I have said so 
far is correct, they cannot consist in any of essentialist, demonstrative, or descriptivist 
beliefs.   
The more formal way of pushing the objection would appeal to Bayesian and other 
hierarchical generative approaches to perception to push against my rejection of tacit 
knowledge in section 3.  While proponents of such views don’t agree on their upshot for 
cognitive permeation (Brössel, 2017; Hohwy, 2013; Stokes & Vance, 2017), they do suggest 
that both perception and perceptual learning are kinds of abductive inferences that take 
top-down information into account.  Hence, someone might be tempted to claim that, 
rather than the lexicalized beliefs I’ve been discussing, diachronic permeation comes 
about due to the role of top-down knowledge in model-based learning. 
Still, however, appealing to tacit knowledge of Bayesian priors in support of the 
dCPT runs into problems specifying the content of the tacit beliefs that are supposed to 
permeate perception.  Consider two possibilities.  First, the beliefs involved in perceptual 
learning might be descriptive beliefs with probabilities attached to them (although these 
kinds of contents have also been attributed to perception itself; see Morrison, 2020).  So, 
one might believe that if an object is a glunk then it is green and round with probability P.  
This kind of belief pretty clearly will not solve the problem, since the attached probability 
does not add any perceptual content to the belief.  If “green and round” is not sufficient to 
describe novel perceptual contents without the probabilistic modifier, then having the 
probability attached does not change anything. 
Second, the priors might be couched in a representation that directly describes the 
feature space.  In Tenenbaum and colleagues’ (Yildirim, Kulkarni, Freiwald, & Tanenbaum, 
2015) model of face recognition, for instance, the priors are encoded in a feature-space of 
lower-level features such as face shape, pose, and lighting conditions, and conditional 
probabilities defined over those parameters constitute a probabilistic representation in the 
face space.  But the problem is now apparent:  the feature spaces that define categories in 
the examples above are not complete until learning has occurred.  So, we can’t represent the 
relevant category via prior knowledge of the categorically relevant dimensions of the 
feature space because, prior to learning, the feature space does not distinguish the relevant 
categories.  And given result that perceptual learning does generate novel features and 
dimensions, the prior knowledge will not describe those dimensions. 
It is thus telling that, when Bayesians model perceptual learning, they often combine 
generative Bayesian models with more bottom-up deep learning ones (Salakhutdinov, 
Tenenbaum, & Torralba, 2013; Yildirim et al., 2015; cf. Buckner, 2018).  According to 
Tenenbaum and colleagues, this allows for “a bottom-up latent variable recognition 
pipeline for our generative model” (Yildirim et al., 2015, p. 2).  And this is for good 
reason—Bayesian models are limited by their need to enlist “a priori” (read, already 
known) variables to describe the domain, whereas bottom-up networks are not.  And 
“committing to the a-priori defined feature representations, instead of learning them from 
data, can be detrimental” for novel stimuli or tasks (Salakhutdinov et al., 2013, p. 1) 
 
4.2.  Weakening Priority? 
 
We can generalize the discussion of Bayesian models above to assess whether a proponent 
of the dCPT could attempt to abandon or weaken the priority condition.  I don’t believe 
that abandonment is an option, since if X enables Y, then it seems obvious that X must 
precede Y.  One might attempt to weaken the condition by positing that beliefs and 
percepts are developed in tandem, for instance by generating new descriptivist beliefs and 
checking them against the data in an iterative hypothesis-and-test method. 
This can’t work as a way of defending the dCPT, because the same situation 
described in the previous sections would arise in terms of the generation and confirmation of 
the hypotheses. Suppose that values along some dimension X are definitive of a perceptual 
category. If one can already perceive X, then one is in a position to both generate and 
confirm a hypothesis about category membership.  But in this case, both the generation 
and confirmation of the hypothesis are being based on already existent perceptual 
capabilities, and not on the generation of novel representations. 
On the other hand, suppose you can’t already perceive X.  If you cannot perceive it, 
according to the morphspace framework, that means you can’t differentiate it from other 
dimensions.  So it would not be available to you as a distinct hypothesis from your 
experience.  Now, you might know independently that there is a dimension X, or someone 
might tell you about it, or you might guess that there is one.  In this case, you could form 
the hypothesis “I wonder if it is X that distinguishes these exemplars,” but since you 
cannot discriminate X, you are in no position to tell if it is really X that determines 
between examples.  The only way you could perceptually confirm this hypothesis is by 
coming to discriminate the dimension.  And as suggested above, this learning is not 
informed by the descriptivist belief. 
 
4.3.  Weakening specificity? 
 
One might be tempted to argue that I’ve foisted too strong a specificity condition on the 
dCPT. In particular, the step from (5) to (6) in the incompatibility argument seems to 
imply a very strong notion of specificity. One might contend that the dCPT theorist can 
reject the argument by abandoning specificity (thus rejecting premise (1)) or weakening it 
(thus denying the move from (5) to (6)). 
Proponents of cognitive permeation are often non-committal about how close a 
semantic relationship, in addition to a causal relationship, is required for an interaction 
between cognition and perception to count as permeation.  Siegel is satisfied with the idea 
that cognitive and perceptual states might have “close” contents.  Stokes (2012, 2013, 
2015) has offered a definition of cognitive permeation that doesn’t define the notion in 
terms of content relationships at all, but instead in terms of whether a causal relationship 
between a cognitive state and a perceptual process is “internal” and “mental.”  Recently, 
he has argued (Stokes, 2018) that these kinds of internal connections can be mediated by 
attention. 
So, the question on the table is whether the specificity condition can be weakened 
or simply abandoned.  The main worry about this move is that it risks trivializing the 
dCPT.  We often must have some relevant beliefs about a category prior to learning to 
perceive it—consider the birds-on-a-mountaintop case again.  Without something like a 
specificity condition, all of the essentialist, demonstrative, and denotational beliefs 
discussed in section 2 will count.  If one really wants to posit that my knowledge that 
“glunks are on the left” permeates my eventual learned perceptual category for glunks, 
it’s hard to legislate against it—it’s certainly a logically possible move.  However, this 
kind of influence on perception is neither surprising nor particularly informative about 
cognitive architecture.   
The situation looks worse when we think about more general knowledge of 
categories. Consider my belief that ostriches are flightless. If I have this belief before I can 
perceptually discriminate ostriches, it certainly will provide some general constraints on 
how I come to learn to perceive them. I will only bother, for instance, looking at objects 
on the ground. (And things can get worse than that; consider “ostriches are objects”.)  If 
these instances count as permeation, then no one would have disagreed with the dCPT in 
the first place. 
This suggests that some degree of semantic relevance or coherence is required for 
the dCPT to hold.  If one wanted to weaken the specificity condition without abandoning 
it, one would have to posit some degree of semantic coherence more strict than the cases 
above, but more permissive than the specificity condition.  One could, for instance, suggest 
that the prior beliefs must describe particular perceptible properties. However, it is 
highly unlikely that there is a principled way of drawing this distinction. All of the 
beliefs I’ve mentioned have some upshot for perceiving categories—for instance, the 
belief that baby birds of a certain type live on mountain tops means something about the 
kind of perceptual surroundings they’re likely to be found in. 
One might go further with this, perhaps by saying that descriptivist beliefs can 
only name lower-level perceptual properties that adhere to the bodies of category 
members. But the only possible justification for restricting the candidates this way 
would be an intuition that these contents are more specific to the perceptual content that’s 
learned. And, given that weakening specificity is what the dCPT proponent is 
purportedly trying to do here, that is an odd move at best. 
Lastly, consider purely causal construals, and in particular causal construals that 
posit attentional mediation between cognition and perception.  I suggest that the 
trivialization worry holds in these cases as well.  In particular, the worry about semantic 
specificity is replaced by a worry about causal specificity.  Suppose that you are going to 
sit stock-still while I present you a lineup of objects, and I tell you that the glunks are on 
the left. You will likely covertly attend to the objects on the left. And this cognitively-
mediated process will contribute to your ability, with enough practice, to recognize 
glunks.  But if this is not a sufficiently close relationship in the semantic case, it’s hard to 
see why it is on a purely causal story either.  Similarly, many loosely connected beliefs 
might be causally prior to perceptual learning.  The causal version of the dCPT would, 
similar to the semantic version, have to posit a way of constricting candidate permeators, 
or risk trivializing the thesis. 
On the contrary, the position that I’ve defended, on which cognitive states are 
causal precursors to purely perceptual learning, need make no arbitrary distinctions of 
this sort. There is nothing wrong with causal precursors being more or less specific, and 
thus focusing us on more or less particular characteristics and more or less constricted 
sets of objects.  Indeed, our doing so might play an important role in perceptual learning. 
It just needn’t be done via permeation. 
  
5.  Conclusion 
 
A correct view of perceptual learning should recognize that we do in fact sometimes have 
descriptive, demonstrative, and denotational beliefs about objects prior to learning to 
perceive them. I’m not entirely sure, as I sit here, what broccoli rabe looks like. But I am 
pretty sure that it’s green, that it’s the kind of thing I can find at the grocery store, and 
moreover that there will be a label there to help me fix the demonstrative belief that a 
particular object is an exemplar of that vegetable. However, rather than implementing 
cognitive permeation, employing these beliefs puts us in a position to acquire certain 
perceptual abilities, by getting us to focus on the right objects, and thus provides causal 
precursors to perceptual learning.  Recognizing the capabilities of perceptual learning, 
independent of cognitive influence, shows us that we don’t need anything more than these 
precursors to explain the role of cognition in in generating new perceptual 
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